I wouldn’t say that Buchanan and Atzmon are in direct conflict, necessarily. But I think their conflicts raise some interesting questions. In regard to aesthetics, Atzmon seems to line up with previous readings in thinking that aesthetics (poetics) make meaning (rhetoric?), while Buchanan thinks that poetics and rhetoric are separate. I’m interested in that strange space in between.
Also of interest to me are their concepts of where design comes from. Atzmon says design derives from cultural meaning; Buchanan thinks it’s based on recognized experience (and “practical wisdom). I think recognized experience and cultural meaning are closely tied but not exactly the same. There’s also Norton, who’s all about emotions and feelings. Emotions and feelings, recognized experience, and cultural meaning all influence each other, so I think the attempt to say that design necessarily comes from one is a bit restrictive.
So, do you think Buchanan and Atzmon would be in direct conflict? Your map situates them relatively close together but not quite touching. Hmmmm…..
I wouldn’t say that Buchanan and Atzmon are in direct conflict, necessarily. But I think their conflicts raise some interesting questions. In regard to aesthetics, Atzmon seems to line up with previous readings in thinking that aesthetics (poetics) make meaning (rhetoric?), while Buchanan thinks that poetics and rhetoric are separate. I’m interested in that strange space in between.
Also of interest to me are their concepts of where design comes from. Atzmon says design derives from cultural meaning; Buchanan thinks it’s based on recognized experience (and “practical wisdom). I think recognized experience and cultural meaning are closely tied but not exactly the same. There’s also Norton, who’s all about emotions and feelings. Emotions and feelings, recognized experience, and cultural meaning all influence each other, so I think the attempt to say that design necessarily comes from one is a bit restrictive.
Oops – meant to write Norman (not Norton) in that last comment.